Labor Contract Formation, Tenuous Torts, and the Realpolitik of Justice Sotomayor on the 50th Anniversary of the Steelworkers Trilogy: Granite Rock v. Teamsters by Gregory, David L. et al.
Labor & Employment Law Forum
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 1
1-1-2011
Labor Contract Formation, Tenuous Torts, and the
Realpolitik of Justice Sotomayor on the 50th
Anniversary of the Steelworkers Trilogy: Granite
Rock v. Teamsters
David L. Gregory
Rowan Foley Reynolds
Nadav Zamir
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lelb
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Labor & Employment Law Forum by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
1 Am. U. Labor & Emp. L.F. 5 (2011).
5ARTICLES
LABOR CONTRACT FORMATION, TENUOUS 
TORTS, AND THE REALPOLITIK OF JUSTICE 
SOTOMAYOR ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF 
THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY: 
GRANITE ROCK V. TEAMSTERS
DAVID L. GREGORY∗1
ROWAN FOLEY REYNOLDS**2
NADAV ZAMIR***3
I. Introduction .........................................................................................6
II.   Factual Background/Procedure ...........................................................8
III.  Lower Court Decisions .....................................................................10
  A. The District Court ......................................................................10
  B.  The Ninth Circuit .......................................................................12
    1.  Denial of Granite Rock’s Tortious Interference 
     Claim Under Section 301(a) .................................................12
    2.  The Effect of the Arbitration Clause .....................................14
IV.  The Supreme Court Decision ............................................................15
  A.  The Majority ..............................................................................15
    1.  The Labor Contract Formation Issue ....................................15
    2.  The Federal Tort Claim Issue ................................................19
*  David L. Gregory is the Dorothy Day Professor of Law and the Executive Director 
of the Center for Labor and Employment Law, St. John’s University School of Law, 8000 
Utopia Parkway, Jamaica, New York 11439; (718) 990–6019; gregoryd@stjohns.edu. 
J.S.D., 1987, Yale Law School; LL.M., 1982 Yale Law School; J.D. magna cum laude, 
1980, University of Detroit; M.B.A. in  Labor Relations, 1977, Wayne State University; 
B.A. cum laude, 1973,  The Catholic University of America.
**2 J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, and Senior Director of Alumni Relations and 
Outreach for the Moot Court Honor Society, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A. 
2006, Yale University.
*** J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, and Editor-in-Chief of the Journal for Civil Rights 
and Economic Development, St. John’s University School of Law; B.S. 2008, John Jay 
College of Criminal Justice.
GREGORY ET AL. 2/13/11 2/21/2011  1:02 AM 
6 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 1:1 
B.   -XVWLFH6RWRPD\RU¶V9LHZ 
The Realpolitik of an Experienced Trial Court Judge ............... 20 
IV.  Analysis and Discussion ....................................................................... 21 
V.   Conclusion ............................................................................................ 25 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the ringing endorsement of labor arbitration in the Steelworkers 
Trilogy,1 WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Granite Rock Co. v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters2 will neither revolutionize 
arbitration nor change the way courts view Section 301(a) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act ³/05$´3²at least not in the immediate 
future. However, Granite Rock may become best known for what it did not 
do²definitively announce whether tort claims may be brought within the 
gamut of Section 301(a). The rich history of Section 301(a) has afforded 
                                                          
1.   The Steelworkers Trilogy is comprised of the following three cases: United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The Steelworkers Trilogy was 
an historic sea change²from the antipathy courts previously manifested toward 
arbitration, to a presumption enthusiastically in favor of arbitration over external 
litigation²as the preferred means of dispute resolution in the labor management 
context. Significant law review articles and keynote addresses regarding the Trilogy 
include: Judge Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The 
Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 3 (1988); David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973); Peter Feuille et al., Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards: Some Evidence, 41 LAB. L.J. 477 (1990); William B. Gould IV, 
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards²Thirty Years of the Steelworkers 
Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464 (1984); 
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel Turns: New Evidence on 
the Finality of Labor Arbitration Awards, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 193-94 
(2007); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential 
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to 
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993); Michael Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits 
on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547 (2005); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review 
of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 
MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977); W. Daniel Boone, Keynote Address at the National 
Academy of ArELWUDWRUV$QQXDO0HHWLQJ%DFNWRWKH%DVLFV$UELWUDWLRQDV³3DUWRID
System of Industrial Self-*RYHUQPHQW´ 0D\   :LOOLDP % *RXOG ,9
Keynote Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting: 
Steelworkers Trilogy After a Half Century (May 27, 2010); Andrew M. Kramer, 
Keynote Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting: Fifty Years 
After the Steelworkers Trilogy: Some New Questions and Old Answers (May 27, 
2010). 
2.   130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).  
3.   See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 
185(a) (2006) (providing independent federal jurisdiction for contractual disputes 
between employers and labor organizations representing employees).  
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the Supreme Court ample opportunity to interpret its purpose and reach.4  
Section 301(a) confers jurisdiction on federal courts in suits between 
employers and unions.5 6RRQ DIWHU LWV SDVVDJH KRZHYHU WKH &RXUW¶V
interpretation of Section 301(a) emphasized an additional policy goal 
flowing from the statute: stability in the collective bargaining process. In 
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, the Court found that Section 
D QRW RQO\ ³FRQIHU>HG@ MXULVGLFWLRQ LQ WKH federal courts over labor 
RUJDQL]DWLRQV´ EXW DOVR ³H[SUHVVH>G@ D IHGHUDO SROLF\ WKDW IHGHUDO FRXUWV
should enforce [arbitration] agreements . . . [in order to achieve] industrial 
SHDFH´ 6 By interpreting Section 301(a) DVD³FRQJUHVVLRQDOPDQGDWHWRWKH
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law to . . . address disputes 
DULVLQJRXWRI ODERUFRQWUDFWV>@´7 the Court took it upon itself to stabilize 
relationships between employers and unions. 
Fifteen years after Section 301(a)¶V SDVVDJH8 contractual stability 
between unions and employers continued to be an underlying concern. In 
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., the Court explained the necessity 
of federal uniformity in collective bargaining disputes to avoid ³[t]he 
possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings 
under state and federal law [which] would inevitably exert a disruptive 
influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective 
DJUHHPHQWV´9 Different state and federal interpretations could prolong 
disputes, thereby dissuading contracting parties from including arbitration 
agreements in the first place.10 TKH&RXUW¶V FRUH FRPPLWPHQW WR VWDELOLW\
within the collective bargaining process guided its Section 301(a) 
jurisprudence.  
                                                          
4.  See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) 
(recognizing Section 301(a) as an independent grant of federal court jurisdiction 
regardless of amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship in order to fashion a 
federal common law to govern disputes of collective bargaining agreements); see also 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213±14 (1985) (holding state-law based 
claims solely created by a collective bargaining agreement are subject to Section 301(a) 
and preempted by federal law); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 
104±05 (1962) (mandating federal common ODZ¶VVXSUHPDF\RYHUORFDODQGVWDWHODZV
in interpreting collective bargaining agreements subject to federal jurisdiction under 
Section 301(a)).  
5.   See § 301(a), § 185(a); see also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455 (observing the 
congressional intent of Section 301(a) was more than merely a jurisdictional grant, but 
also to provide legal remedies to the parties of collective bargaining agreements). 
6.   Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455. 
7.   Lueck, 471 U.S. at 209.    
8.   See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), Pub. L. No. 80-
101, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006)) (creating jurisdiction 
to allow for private suits to enforce the substance of collective bargaining agreements 
between employers and unions). 
9.   Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103. 
10.  Id. at 104. 
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Although the &RXUW¶V Rpinion in Granite Rock focused more on 
addressing the availability of options Granite Rock might still pursue²as 
opposed to explaining why the Court did not endorse the claim for tortious 
interference of contract²the Court madHFOHDU WKDW³>W@KHEDODQFH IHderal 
statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collective-
bargaining arena is carefully calibrated.´11 Consequently, the Court held 
that ³FUHDWLQJ D IHGHUDO FRPPRQ-law tort cause of action [under Section 
301(a)] would require a host of policy choices that could easily upset this 
EDODQFH>@´12 The majority went no further, finding no need to determine 
whether Section 301(a) represented a Congressional mandate to create a 
body of federal tort law regarding the enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreements.13   
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND/PROCEDURE 
Granite Rock Co. and Teamsters Local 287 ³/RFDO´ were parties to 
a collective bargaining agreement ³&%$´ IRU ILYH\HDUV WKDWH[SLUHGRQ
April 30, 2004.14 Preliminary negotiations for a new agreement began in 
March 2004, yet the parties were unable to reach a resolution by May 
2004.15 After reaching impasse, Local 287 began its strike of Granite Rock 
on June 9, 2004.16 On July 2, 2004 at 4 a.m., a new four-year agreement 
was allegedly reached containing a broad arbitration clause for the 
VHWWOHPHQWRI³DQ\GLVSXWHV´DULVLQJXQGHUWKHDJUHHPHQWDVZHOODVD³QR-
VWULNHFODXVH´FRYHULQJWKHSHULRGIURP0D\±April 30, 2008.17 The 
parties were not, however, able to reach a separate back-to-work agreement 
that would indemnify Local union members from liability for any strike-
related damages Granite Rock incurred.18 Later that morning, Local 287 
                                                          
11.   See Granite Rock &RY,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2864 (2010); 
see also NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639 (Local 639), 362 
U.S. 274, 289±290 (1960) (acknowledging that the Taft-+DUWOH\$FWZDV³WKHUHVXOWRI
FRQIOLFW DQGFRPSURPLVH´ WR VWULNHDEDODQFHEHWZHHQ WKHSRZHURIPDQDJHPHQW DQG
labor). 
12.   Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2864.   
13.   See id. at 2864±65 FRXFKLQJWKH&RXUW¶VGHQLDOWRUHFRJQL]HDIHGHUDOFRPPRQ
law tort under Section 301(a) as premature, given the other remedies available to 
Granite Rock). 
14.   *UDQLWH5RFN&R Y ,QW¶O%KG RI7HDPVWHUV /RFDO  (Local 287 IV), 546 
F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008), DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶GLQSDUWVXEQRPGranite Rock Co. 
Y,QW¶O%KG2I7HDPVWHUV6&W  
15.   *UDQLWH5RFN&RY ,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV/RFDO (Local 287 I), 402 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
16.   Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2853. 
17.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1171. 
18.   See Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1122±REVHUYLQJ/RFDO¶VFODLPWKDW
the acceptance of the new collective bargaining agreement was subject to reaching an 
DJUHHPHQWRQWKH³%DFNWR:RUN$JUHHPHQW´ 
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allegedly ratified the new CBA.19 Granite Rock then claimed that George 
1HWWR/RFDO¶VEXVLQHVVUHSUHVHQWDWive, called Granite Rock to confirm 
that the Union had ratified the new agreement.20 However, Local 287 
denied that union members ratified the agreement, contending that this 
UDWLILFDWLRQ ZDV D FRQGLWLRQ WR WKH DJUHHPHQW RI D ³EDFN WR ZRUN
DJUHHPHQW´21 Granite Rock countered that there was an agreement to 
discuss the back to work agreement at a later date, and that the back to 
work agreement was subject to the grievance procedure outlined in the new 
agreement.22 
On July 5, 2004/RFDO¶VPHPEHUVUHFHLYHGLnstructions from Rome 
Aloise, the administrative assistant to the General President of the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO %URWKHUKRRG RI 7HDPVWHUV ³,%7´ DQG other members of 
Local 287 to refrain from returning to work.23 Granite Rock alleged that on 
July 6th, 2004, Mr. Netto demanded a back-to-work agreement that would 
protect Local 287 and IBT from liability arising from the strike prior to 
returning to work.24 When Granite Rock refused, the strike continued²
which Granite Rock alleged violated the new collective bargaining 
DJUHHPHQW¶VQR-strike provision.25 The strike continued until September 13, 
2004, and the parties executed their new collective bargaining agreement in 
'HFHPEHU³'HFHPEHU&%$´26   
The parties agreed that the December CBA was a valid contract and that 
it was retroactive to May,27 but they disagreed as to the scope of the 
retroactivity. The oral arguments to the Supreme Court are illustrative: 
MR. MATHIASON [counsel for Granite Rock]: Your Honor, 
ZKDW¶VUHDOO\FHQWUDOLVWKHIDFWWKDWZKHQZHVLJQHGin December, 
we signed the agreement of July 2nd. That is critical. If there had 
been no ratification on July 2nd, there would be no contract. And 
when the union signed, they take the position that they signed a 
contract ratified on August 22nd. Those are radically different 
events . . . .28 
                                                          
19.   Id. The basis of the disagreement between Local 287 and Granite Rock 
concerns whether the Local 287 did, in fact, ratify the agreement on July 2, 2004. Local 
287 asserted that acceptance of the agreement was conditioned on GraQLWH 5RFN¶V
DFFHSWDQFHRID³%DFNWR:RUN$JUHHPHQW´ 
20.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1171±72. 
21.   Id. at 1172. 
22.   Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1122±23. 
23.   Id. at 1171±72. 
24.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1172. 
25.   Id. 
26.   Granite Rock &RY,QW¶l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2861 (2010). 
27.   Id. at 2867. 
28.   Transcript of Oral Argument at 17±18*UDQLWH5RFNY,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV
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JUSTICE ALITO:  Am I correct that neither you, neither Granite 
Rock nor the Local, thinks that the December collective 
bargaining DJUHHPHQW UHDOO\ ZDV IXOO\ UHWURDFWLYH" 7KH\ GRQ¶W
think it was-- 
  
MR. MATHIASON: 7KDW¶VFRUUHFW29  
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  So ± VR \RX GRQ¶W WKLQN >WKH
December CBA] included the no-strike clause--30 
 
MR. BONSALL [counsel for Local 287]: We contend that it 
would not . . . .31 
The subject of the disagreement was whether the December CBA 
executed the CBA retroactively to the July 2nd ratification vote or the 
August 22nd ratification vote by Local 287. This dispute left open the 
question of whether both parties agreed to arbitrate the July strike²a 
dispute requiring judicial resolution.32 
III. LOWER COURT DECISIONS 
A. The District Court 
On July 9, 2004, Granite Rock filed a complaint in United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California against Local 287, alleging 
that Local 287 had participated in an unlawful strike and invoking federal 
jurisdiction under Section 301(a) of the LMRA.33 Granite Rock amended 
its complaint to include a request for injunctive relief through a temporary 
restraining order.34 The court denied injunctive relief and found that the 
new agreement had not been ratified.35 Granite Rock filed another motion 
for a new trial based on new evidence.36 Local 287 responded with a 
                                                          
130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010) (No. 08-1214), 2010 WL 171664. 
29.   Id. at 18 (alteration in original). 
30.   Id. at 25 (alteration in original).  
31.   Id.  
32.   See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) 
(³>:@KHWKHUSDUWLHVKDYHVXEPLWWHGDSDUWLFXODUGLVSXWHWRDUELWUDWLRQLVDQLVVXHIRU
MXGLFLDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQ>@´ (citing AT&T TeFKV ,QFY&RPPF¶QV:RUNHUV86
643, 649 (1986))).  
33.   Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
34.   Id.  
35.   Id.  
36.   See generally Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Motion to 
Vacate Dismissal of the FLUVW$PHQGHG&RPSODLQW*UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGRI
Teamsters, Local 287 (Local 287 I), 402 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 04-
CV-02767), 2004 WL 5571934 (arguing that Granite Rock is entitled to a new trial 
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request for judgment on the pleadings.37 The court denied the Local 287¶V
motion.38 
In the first of a series of orders, the DiVWULFW&RXUWJUDQWHG/RFDO¶V
PRWLRQ WR OLPLW WKH WULDOFRXUW¶V UHYLHZWRZKHWKHUDFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJ
DJUHHPHQWZDVLQHIIHFWZKHQGHIHQGDQW¶VDOOHJHGYLRODWLRQWRRNSODFHDQG
if so, reserved questions of whether an actual violation of the agreement 
occurred and the amount of damages for arbitration.39 The court denied 
GHIHQGDQW¶V PRWLRQ WR VWULNH *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V MXU\ GHPDQG and found 
*UDQLWH5RFN¶Vrequest to be timely.40  
,Q LWV VHFRQG RUGHU WKH 'LVWULFW &RXUW GHQLHG /RFDO ¶V PRWLRQ IRU
summary judgment on issue preclusion.41 Local 287 moved for summary 
judgment after the National Labor Relations Board¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWWKH
July 2nd collective bargaining agreement did not exist at the time of Local 
¶V VWULNH42 However, the court found that Granite Rock had expressly 
³UHVHUYHGWKHUDWLILFDWLRQLVVXHIRUOLWLJDWLRQLQ[District Court]´43 
On February 14, in its third order, the District Court granted Granite 
5RFN¶V PRWLRQ WR DGG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO %URWKHUKRRG RI 7HDPVWHUV DV D
defendant.44 The court pointed to documents indicating that Rome Aloise, 
the Administrative Assistant to the General President of IBT, had, among 
                                                          
because of newly discovered evidencHDQG WKHFRXUW¶V MXGJPHQWPXVWEHDPHQGHGRU
altered to vacate the dismissal of the complaint). 
37.   Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
38.   See id. (observing denial of a motion for judgment under FED. R. CIV. PRO. 
12(c) was appropriate because of the underlying factual dispute concerning the 
ratification date of the December CBA by Local 287).  
39.   See id. at 1126±27 (holding that Local 287 was neither estopped from, nor had 
waived its ability of, invoking the arbitration provision of the December CBA since 
/RFDO¶VDOWHUQDWLYHDUJXPHQWWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKH&%$DWWKHtime of the dispute 
had always been that if such an agreement was found, the matter should be referred to 
arbitration).  
40.   See idDWREVHUYLQJWKDW*UDQLWH5RFN¶VUHTXHVt for a jury trial was made 
ZLWKLQWHQGD\VRI/RFDO¶VODVWILOLQJZKLFKFRPSRUWVZLWKFED. R. CIV. P. 38(b)). 
41.   *UDQLWH5RFN&RY ,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV/RFDO (Local 287 II), 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36048, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2006).  
42.   See id. at *2, *5±REVHUYLQJWKDW/RFDO¶VDUJXPHQWZDVEDVHGRQWKHIDFW
WKDW WKH 1/5%¶V DGMXGLFDWLRQ RI *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V XQIDLU ODERU SUDFWLFH FKDUJH ZDV
binding on Granite Rock). 
43.   See id. at *15. Cf. 7HDPVWHUV/RFDO,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUs (Granite Rock 
&R  1/5%   Q  DIILUPLQJ WKH $GPLQLVWUDWLYH /DZ -XGJH¶V
decision not to reach the issue of whether Local 287 held a ratification vote on July 2, 
2004, DV GRLQJ VRZDV DOOHJHG LQ WKH FRPSODLQW DQG WKH1/5%¶V*HQHUDO &RXQVHO¶V
WKHRU\RIWKHFDVHFRQWUROVWKHLVVXHVDWWULDOQRWWKH&KDUJLQJ3DUW\¶V 
44.   See *UDQLWH5RFN&R Y ,QW¶O%KG RI 7HDPVWHUV /RFDO  (Local 287 III), 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25606, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2006) (applying DCD 
Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) to allow Granite Rock to 
OLEHUDOO\DPHQGLWVFRPSODLQW³ZKHQMXVWLFHVRUHTXLUHV´FLWLQJFED. R. CIV. P. 15(a))). 
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other things, encouraged Local 287 to continue to strike.45 
Ultimately, the District Court found that the ratification date issue was 
one for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide.46 After a federal jury found 
that Local 287 ratified the December CBA on July 2, 2004, the District 
Court referred the issues of breach of contract and damages to arbitration 
DQG GLVPLVVHG *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V tortious interference of contract claim 
against IBT.47  
B. The Ninth Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part.48 Judge Gould found that the District Court properly 
GLVPLVVHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VWRUWLRXV interference of contract claim for failing 
to state a claim.49 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court 
HUUHG LQGHQ\LQJ/RFDO¶VPRWLRQ WR FRPSHO DUELWUDWLRQDQG UHPDQGHG
³WKH HQWLUH GLVSXWH´ IRU DUELWUDWLRQ ILQGLQJ LW XQQHFHVVDU\ WR DGdress the 
contract formation issue.50 
1.  'HQLDORI*UDQLWH5RFN¶V7RUWLRXV,QWHUIHUHQFH&ODLP8QGHU6HFWLRQ
301(a) 
Judge Gould, writing for a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel, based the 
FRXUW¶Vopinion on Painting & Decorating Contractors Ass¶n v. Painters & 
Decorators Joint Committee, Inc.,51 a Ninth Circuit decision from 1983 
outlining the requirements for jurisdiction under Section 301(a).52 First, a 
FODLP PXVW EH ³EDVHG RQ DQ DOOHJHG EUHDFK RI FRQWUDFW EHWZHHQ DQ
employer and a labor organization.´53 Second, ³the resolution of the lawsuit 
[must] EHIRFXVHGXSRQDQGJRYHUQHGE\WKHWHUPVRIWKHFRQWUDFW´54 The 
1LQWK&LUFXLW IRXQG WKDW WKH'LVWULFW&RXUW¶V GLVPLVVDO RI*UDQLWH5RFN¶V
claim against IBT for tortious interference was correct because the claim 
did nRW ³DULVH XQGHU´ WKH QHZ FROOHFWLYH EDUJDLQLQJ DJUHHPHQW EHWZHHQ
                                                          
45.   See id. at *3±4 (couching its decision to allow IBT to be added as a defendant 
on the great amount of assistance that IBT allegedly provided to Local 287 through 
Aloise during and prior to the strike). 
46.   *UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2855 (2010). 
47.   Id. 
48.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008), DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶GLQSDUW
sub nom. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010). 
49.   See id XSKROGLQJ WKH 'LVWULFW &RXUW¶V UXOLQJ that FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) 
SUHFOXGHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VFODLPRIWRUWXRXVLQWHUIHUHQFH 
50.   Id.  
51.   707 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1983).  
52.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1172. 
53.   Id. (internal quotations omitted).    
54.   Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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Granite Rock and Local 287 reached on July 2, 2004.55 The court further 
noted that other circuit courts also declined to extend a Section 301(a) 
FDXVHRIDFWLRQWR³SDUWLHVQRWJRYHUQHGE\WKH UHOHYDQWDJUHHPHQW´56  
7KH1LQWK&LUFXLWDOVRGLVPLVVHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWDIHGHUDO
tort claim was cognizable under Section 301(a).57 The Court of Appeals 
stated that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent interpreting Section 
D DV ³D PDQdate to create a federal common law of labor contract 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQQRWDQLQGHSHQGHQWERG\RIWRUWODZ´58 As to satisfying the 
VHFRQG HOHPHQW RI 6HFWLRQ D *UDQLWH 5RFN DUJXHG WKDW ³EHFDXVH
breach of the underlying contract is a necessary element of the tortious 
LQWHUIHUHQFH FODLP WKH UHVROXWLRQ RI WKH WRUW FODLP LV µIRFXVHG XSRQ¶ DQG
µJRYHUQHG E\¶ WKH FRQWUDFW´59 In addition, Granite Rock pointed to the 
³FORVH UHODWLRQVKLS´ EHWZHHQ /RFDO  DQG ,%7 WR KLJKOLJKW WKH EHQHILW
that IBT gained by the /RFDO¶V EUHDFK60 7KH FRXUW QRWHG WKH DUJXPHQW¶V
³HPRWLYHIRUFH´EXWheld WKDW*UDQLWH5RFN¶VDUJXPHQWODFNHGSUHFHGHQWLDO
support.61 
Unable to persuade the Ninth Circuit on plain language grounds, Granite 
Rock turned to legislative intent, arguing that Congress intended Section 
D WRH[WHQG WRSDUWLHV VXFKDV ,%7RXWRIFRQFHUQV IRU³IXQGDPHQWDO
IDLUQHVV´62 %XW*UDQLWH5RFN¶VUHOLDQFHRQOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\WRHVWDEOLVKD
tortious interference claim under Section 301(a) also proved unpersuasive. 
The couUW IHOW ERXQG E\ WKH VWDWXWH¶V ODQJXDJH DQG WKDW ³>D@Q\ µJDS¶ WKDW
PLJKWH[LVWLQ&RQJUHVV¶VODERUODZGHVLJQLVIRU&RQJUHVVDQGQRWIRU>WKH
FRXUWV@WRILOO´63 
                                                          
55.   Id. at 1173.  
56.   Id. at 1174 (citing Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 
572 (2d Cir. 1995); ,QW¶O8QLRQ8QLWHG0LQH:RUNHUVRI$PY&RYHQDQW&RDO&RUS
977 F.2d 895, 897 (4th Cir. 1992); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 
No. 1564 v. Quality Plus Stores, Inc., 961 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1992); Serv., Hosp., 
Nursing Home & Pub. Emps. Union, Local No. 47 v. Commercial Prop. Servs., Inc., 
755 F.2d 499, 509 (6th Cir. 1985); Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 
1982); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 501 
(5th Cir. 1982)). But see id. at 1174± GLVFXVVLQJ WKH 7KLUG &LUFXLW¶V DGRSWLRQ RI
tortious interference claims under Section 301(a) (citing Wilkes-%DUUH 3XEO¶J &R Y
Newspaper Guild, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1981))). 
57.   See Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d DW³*UDQLWH5RFN¶Vassertion that we should 
create a federal common law to reach IBT misinterprets our instructions from Congress 
DQGWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW´ 
58.   Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985)). 
59.   Id. at 1173. 
60.   Id. at 1173±74. 
61.   Id. at 1174. 
62.  Id. at 1175. 
63.   Id.  
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2.  The Effect of the Arbitration Clause 
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the effect of the arbitration clause 
found in the December CBA.64 The court began by pointing out the 
distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between challenges to arbitration 
clauses and those directed at the validity of the entire contract.65 It noted 
that the arbitrator should consider all challenges to the validity of the 
contract, while only courts may consider challenges to the arbitration 
clause.66 Following this precedent, the Ninth Circuit found that, because 
Granite Rock failed to make an independent challenge to the arbitration 
clause, it FRXOGQRWFKDOOHQJHWKHFODXVH¶VYDOLGLW\WKURXJKDJHQHUDOEUHDFK
of contract action.67 Granite Rock again argued that Local 287 should be 
estopped from asserting the arbitration clause in the first place because 
Local 287 disputed that a contract between the parties had ever been 
formed.68 However, the court found that it had already rejected similar 
arguments in Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp.,69 where the Ninth Circuit 
GLVPLVVHG WKH SODLQWLII¶V FODLP LQ RUGHU WR DYRLG WKH ³DEVXUG UHVXOW´ Rf 
finding for the validity of a contract while ignoring its arbitration 
provision.70 Ultimately, the court found that both parties consented to 
arbitration²*UDQLWH5RFNGRLQJVR³LPSOLFLWO\E\VXLQJXQGHUWKHFRQWUDFW
containing the arbitration clause, and Local 287 explicitly by asserting the 
DUELWUDWLRQFODXVH´ as an affirmative defense.71  
                                                          
64.   Id. at 1176. 
65.   Id.  
66.   See id. ³>8@QOHVVWKHFKDOOHQJHLVWRWKHDUELWUDWLRQFODXVHLWVHOIWKHLVVXHRIWKH
FRQWUDFW¶V YDOLGLW\ LV FRQVLGHUHG E\ WKH DUELWUDWRU LQ WKH ILUVW LQVWDQFH´ (alteration in 
original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445±46 (2006))).  
67.   See id. DW  DVVHUWLQJ WKH'HFHPEHU&%$¶V DUELWUDWLRQ FODXVHZDV EURDG
enough to cover a dispute of contract formation because the clausH FRYHUHG ³>D@OO
GLVSXWHV DULVLQJ XQGHU WKLV DJUHHPHQW´ DOWHUDWLRQ LQ RULJLQDO LQWHUQDO TXRWDWLRQV
omitted) (citing Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 
1142 (9th Cir. 1991))). 
68.   See id. at 1177±78. 
69.   892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989).  
70.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1178 (citing Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 
1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
71.   See id. (conceding that either Granite Rock or Local 287 might have retained 
their right to have a court resolve the date on which the contract was formed had they 
QRWLPSOLFLWO\DVVHUWHGWKHFRQWUDFW¶VYDOLGLW\E\UHO\LQJRQWKHDUELWUDWLRQFODXVH 
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
A. The Majority  
In a seven to two decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Court 
UHYHUVHG LQ SDUW DQG DIILUPHG LQ SDUW WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW¶s decision.72 The 
Court addressed two issues: 1) whether an arbitrator or the District Court 
VKRXOGGHFLGHWKHSDUWLHV¶GLVSXWHRYHUWKH&%$¶VUDWLILFDWLRQGDWHDQG
ZKHWKHU WKH1LQWK&LUFXLW LQFRUUHFWO\GHFOLQHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶V³UHTXHVW WR
recognize a new federal cause of action under [Section] 301(a) of the Labor 
0DQDJHPHQW 5HODWLRQV$FW´ IRU WRUWLRXV LQWHUIHUHQFH RI FRQWUDFW73 As to 
the first issue, the Court held that the ratification dispute was for the 
District Court to decide.74 As to the second, it concluded that Granite Rock 
could not bring a tortious interference of contract claim under Section 
301(a) of the LMRA.75 
1.  The Labor Contract Formation Issue 
The Court first addressed if D GLVSXWH DV WR ZKHWKHU WKH SDUWLHV¶
agreement to submit their dispute to arbitration was a matter for an 
arbitrator or a judge to decide.76 The specific issue was whether Granite 
Rock and Local 287 agreed to arbitrate the question of when the contract 
was ratified and thereby formed.77 As an initial matter, Justice Thomas 
noted that both parties agreed that the arbitration clause in the contract was 
valid and that certain issues should be arbitrated pursuant to the clause.78 
The initial question in arbitration disputes is whether the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate a particular issue, which often implicates the question of 
contract formation.79 When the question is if a contract has been formed, 
                                                          
72.   See *UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGof Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2853 (2010) 
(holding that the Ninth Circuit erred by referring resolution of the ratification date of 
the December CBA to arbitration because it should be done judicially, but finding no 
HUURU LQ WKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶V UHIXVDO WRcreate a new tortious interference with contract 
cause of action under Section 301(a)). 
73.   Id. 
74.   Id. 
75.   Id.  
76.   See id. at 2855 (explaining that courts typically determine whether parties have 
DJUHHGWR³VXEPLWDSDUWLFXODUGLVSXWHWRDUELWUDWLRQ´LQWHUQDOTXRWDWLRQPDUNVRPLWWHG
(citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002))). 
77.   See id. at 2855± ³>$ GLVSXWH RQ@ FRQWUDFW IRUPDWLRQ    LV JHQHUDOO\ IRU
FRXUWVWRGHFLGH´ 
78.   See id. at 2856±QRWLQJWKDW*UDQLWH5RFNKDG³FRQFHGHGERWKWKHIRUPDWLRQ
and the validity of the . . . arbitration clauVH´ 
79.   See id. DW  ³>$@ FRXUWPD\RUGHU DUELWUDWLRQ RI DSDUWLFXODU GLVSXWHRQO\
where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute´emphasis 
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that issue goes to a court to decide, because a court cannot require a 
defendant to arbitrate rights and liabilities of a contract to which she is not 
bound. But the Court distinguished Granite Rock as concerning when, not if 
Local 287 had ratified the CBA.80 Granite Rock asserted that the contract, 
which contained a no-strike clause, became binding before Local 287 went 
on strike, which in turn rendered Local 287 in breach of the contract.81 
Local 287 asserted that the contract was not formed before the strike, but 
afterwards²therefore, Local 287 argued it should not be held liable for 
breach of contract when it went on strike.82  
Compelling arbitration of a particular issue is appropriate in situations in 
which both parties have already agreed to arbitrate the issue.83 When the 
parties agree to arbitrate a certain issue, they do so with the assumption that 
the arbitrator will decide the caVH ZLWKLQ WKH IUDPHZRUN RI WKH SDUWLHV¶
contract.84 The parties assume that an arbitrator will use the provisions of 
their contract to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties, 
including when those rights and responsibilities come into existence. 
Before an arbitrator can construe the terms of a contract, however, the 
rights and responsibilities must have already come into existence, that is, 
when the contract is formed. Justice Thomas emphasized that ³>I@RU
purposes of determining arbitrability, when a contract is formed can be as 
critical as whether LWZDVIRUPHG´85  
Justice Thomas also DGGUHVVHGWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHDOO-
inclusive arbitration clause in the CBA covered the issue of when the 
contract was formed. He noted that WKH1LQWK&LUFXLW³RYHUORRNHGWKHIDFW
that this theory of the ratification dispute¶s arbitrability fails if the CBA 
was not formed at the time the unions engaged in the acts that gave rise to 
*UDQLWH5RFN¶VVWULNHFODLPV´86 In this way, the majority rejected the Ninth 
&LUFXLW¶VDWWHPSWWRWLHWKHDUELWUDELOLW\RIWKHDecember &%$¶VUDWLILFDWLRQ
                                                          
in original)). 
80.   See id. DW  Q QRWLQJ WKDW DOWKRXJK WKH XQLRQ¶V ratification vote is not 
usually a requirement for proper formation of a CBA, it was in the instant case because 
both Local 287 and Granite Rock agreed that a ratification vote was a prerequisite).  
81.   See id. at 2854 (explaining that Granite Rock first asked the District Court to 
remedy the breach by enjoining the strike). 
82.   Id.  
83.   See id. at 2856±57 ³$UELWUDWLRQLVVWULFWO\µDPDWWHURIFRQVHQW¶DQGWKXVµLV
a way to resolve those disputes²but only those disputes²that the parties have agreed 
WRVXEPLWWRDUELWUDWLRQ>@¶´HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDOFLWDWLRQVRPLWWHG 
84.   See id. at 2859 & n.8 (analogizing the approach courts take in determining 
arbitrability in labor cases to the role of courts in cases governed by the Federal 
Arbitration Act²DFRXUW¶VUROHLVWRVXEPLWRQO\WKRVHJULHYDQFHV³WKDWWKHSDUWLHVKDYH
DJUHHGWRVXEPLW´ 
85.   Id. at 2860 (emphasis in original). 
86.   Id. at 2861. 
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date with the arbitrability of the strike claims.87  
Indeed, because the union began its strike on July 6th, but may not have 
ratified the agreement²and consequently had not formed a contract²until 
August 22nd, there was not necessarily a CBA for the July no-strike 
dispute to ³arise under.´88 :KLOH WKHUH ZDV QR GLVSXWH WKDW WKH &%$¶V
DUELWUDWLRQFODXVHFRYHUHG³DOOGLVSXWHVDULVLQJRXWRI WKLVDJUHHPHQW´WKH
Court found that issues of formation did not so obviously fall under the 
GHILQLWLRQRI³DULVLQJXQGHU´89  
Because the Court framed the issue as one of contract formation, the 
&RXUW IRXQG WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW¶V UDWLRQDOH XQSHUVXDVLYH EHFDXVH ³WKH
[December] CBA was not [necessarily] formed at the time the unions 
HQJDJHG LQ WKH DFWV WKDW JDYH ULVH WR *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V VWULNH FODLPV´90 
Finally, Justice Thomas noted that the Ninth Circuit should have read the 
³DULVLQJXQGHU´ODQJXDJHRIWKHDUELWUDWLRQSURYLVLRQ to determine whether 
the clause covered the formation-date dispute, rather than merely focusing 
on whether the no-VWULNH FODXVH ZDV FRYHUHG E\ WKH &%$¶V DUELWUDWLRQ
clause.91 In essence, the agreement itself did not contemplate that 
arbitration would answer all issues²instead, the arbitration clause, like the 
no-strike clause, were part of the contractual scheme. Justice Thomas 
concluded that Granite Rock did not consent to arbitration merely because 
it sued under the contract that contained the arbitration clause.92  
ThH&RXUWGLVWLQJXLVKHG WKHFDVH¶V WLPLQJ LVVXHDVDW\SLFDO LQ WKDW WKLV
dispute centered on when, not whether, Local 287 ratified the new 
collective bargaining agreement.93 The Court dispelled Local 287 and the 
1LQWK&LUFXLW¶V UHOLDQFHXSRQ WZRSULQFLSOHV Whe Court had previously set 
forth in arbitrability cases.94 Instead, the Court focused on consent²or 
                                                          
87.   See id. at 2861 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for failing to observe that if, as 
Local 287 contended, the December CBA was ratified in August rather than July, the 
no-VWULNH FODXVH RI WKH'HFHPEHU&%$ZRXOG EH LQDSSOLFDEOH WR WKHSDUWLHV¶ GLVSXWH
and the matter would not be arbitrable).  
88.   Id. 
89.   See id. at 2862 (couching WKH &RXUW¶V conclusion RQ D ³UHODWLYHO\ QDUURZ´
UHDGLQJRIWKH'HFHPEHU&%$¶V³DULVLQJXQGHUWKLVDJUHHPHQW´ODQJXDJHDVWRH[FOXGH
a dispute as to the ratification date of the same agreement). 
90.   See id. at 2861 (mentioning the additional procedural requirement for 
mediation prior to arbitration under the December CBA). 
91.   Id. at 2862. 
92.   Id. at 2862±63.  
93.   See id. at 2856. 
94.   7KH ILUVW SULQFLSOH UHOLHG XSRQZDV WKDW ³DQ\GRXEWV FRQFHUQLQJ WKH VFRSH RI
DUELWUDO LVVXHV VKRXOG EH UHVROYHG LQ IDYRU RI DUELWUDWLRQ´ Id. at 2857 (quoting 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)). 
7KHVHFRQGSULQFLSOHZDV WKDW³LQFDVHVJRYHUQHGE\ WKH)HGHUDO$UELWUDWLRQ$FW   
courts must treat the arbitration clause as severable from the contrDFW´XQOHVVDSDUW\
challenges the validity of the arbitration clause or the formation of the contract. Id. at 
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rather, the lack thereof.95 Indeed, Justice Thomas ultimately concluded that 
a court ³PXVW UHVROYH WKH [formation-date] disagreement´ EHFDXVH /RFDO
287 disputed the formation of the December CBA, and thus the arbitration 
clause.96 In short, the Court ruled the presumption in favor of arbitrability 
³RYHUULGHVWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWDFRXUWPD\VXEPLW WRDUELWUDWLRQµRQO\ WKRVH
disputes . . . that the parties have agreed to submit[.]¶´97 Policy concerns, 
WKH &RXUW QRWHG KDG QHYHU EHHQ KHOG ³DV D VXEVWLWXWH IRU SDUW\
DJUHHPHQW´98 
In dicta, the Court explained, regardless of whether the dispute was one 
RI FRQWUDFW IRUPDWLRQ WKH GLVSXWH IHOO ³RXWVLGH WKH VFRSH RI WKH SDUWLHV¶
DUELWUDWLRQ FODXVH´ WKDW D ³SUHVXPSWLRQ IDYRULQJ DUELWUDWLRQ FDQQRW FXUH´ 
because the ratification date went WR³WKH&%$¶VYHU\H[LVWHQFH´GXULQJWKH
July strike.99 Second, even if the CBA could be interpreted to cover the 
formation dispute, the arbiWUDWLRQ FODXVH¶V UHPDLQLQJ SURYLVLRQV FOHDUO\
indicated that use of the arbitration machinery was expressly limited to 
those disputes between Granite Rock and Local 287 that were affirmatively 
addressed in the other provisions of the CBA.100  
The Court also addressed Local 287¶V UHWURDFWLYLW\ DUJXPHQW101 Local 
287 argued that because the parties executed a document in December 2004 
that made the CBA effective as of the previous May; WKH&%$¶VDUELWUDWLRQ
clause was therefore effective during the July strike period.102 However, 
because Local 287 did not raise this argument in the Court of Appeals, the 
majority found that the argument had been waived.103   
                                                          
2857 (citations omitted). 
95.   See id. at 2856 & n.4, 2857 & n.6 (observing that the parties agreed that given 
the facts of their case, a valid formation of the contract required a union ratification 
vote). 
96.   Id. at 2858.  
97.   Id. at 2859 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
943 (1995)) (alteration in original).  
98.   Id. 
99.   See id. at 2862 (distinguishing that thHDUELWUDELOLW\RI/RFDO¶V-XO\VWULNH
activity is linked to whether the December CBA had been ratified at the point in the 
time when the complained-of strike actually occurred). 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. at 2861. 
102.  See id. (noting that Local 287 did not argue that the no-strike clause was 
retroactive, however Local 287 did propose the retroactivity of the arbitration clause 
ZDV DQ ³DOWHUQDWLYH JURXQG RQ ZKLFK WKH &RXUW FRXOG RU VKRXOG DIILUP WKH [Ninth 
&LUFXLW¶V@MXGJPHQW´). 
103.  See id. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Stevens, agreed that a tortious 
LQWHUIHUHQFHRIFRQWUDFWFODLPZDV³QRWFRJQL]DEOH´XQGHU6HFWLRQD Id. at 2866 
6RWRPD\RU -FRQFXUULQJ LQSDUWGLVVHQWLQJ LQSDUW6KHSDUWHGZLWK WKHPDMRULW\¶V
view that Local 287 had waived its retroactivity argument. See id. at 2868±69. The 
dispute, in her opinion, should be decided by an arbitrator. Id. at 2868. As to the waiver 
LVVXH-XVWLFH6RWRPD\RUIRFXVHGRQWKHSDUWLHV¶LQWHQWLQWKDWWKH\³H[SUHVVO\FKRVHWR
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Concluding its discussion of the first issue, the Court refused to accept 
Local 287¶VFRQWHQWLRQ²and the finding of the lower court²that Granite 
Rock impliedly consented to arbitration by bringing VXLW ³WR HQIRUFH WKH
&%$¶V no-strike SURYLVLRQV´104 7KH &RXUW IRXQG WKDW *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V
attempt to seek an injunction of the strike in order to arbitrate the grievance 
did not result in its consent to arbitrate the date at which the CBA became 
effective.105 7KH&RXUWVHSDUDWHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VDWWHPSWVWRDUELWUDWHLVVXHV
related to the strike from the December &%$¶V IRUPDWLRQ DQ LVVXH WKDW
Granite Rock had always maintained was beyond the reach of the CBA.106  
2.  The Federal Tort Claim Issue 
7KH &RXUW UHMHFWHG *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW 6HFWLRQ D
SHUPLWWHGLWWREULQJDIHGHUDOWRUWFODLPIRU,%7¶VDOOHJHGLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWK
the CBA.107 Granite Rock contended that the Court should reject the 
majority view of the Courts of Appeals on the issue, because to accept their 
UHDVRQLQJ ZRXOG KDYH FRQWUDGLFWHG WKH ODUJHU SROLF\ JRDO RI ³SURPRWLQJ
industrial peace and economic stability through judicial enforcement of 
CBAs, [as well as] with [the] &RXUW¶V SUHFHGHQWV KROGLQJ WKDW D IHGHUDO
common law of labor contracts is necessary to further [that] JRDO´108 In 
addition, Granite Rock maintained that a federal tort claim under Section 
DZDVQHFHVVDU\EHFDXVHRWKHUUHPHGLHVZHUH³HLWKHr unavailable or 
LQVXIILFLHQW´109 
7KH &RXUW UHMHFWHG ERWK *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V SROLF\ DUJXPHQW DQG LWV
contention that failure to allow a federal tortious interference with contract 
claim against IBT under Section 301(a) would place Granite Rock in a 
wholly untenable position.110 7KH&RXUWYLHZHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VSRVLWLRQLQ
a more flexible light, and pointed out that, while Section 301(a) did create a 
body of federal law to deal with the enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreement issues, allowing Granite Rock to bring a federal tort claim under 
                                                          
make the agreement effective IURP0D\´Id. at 2867. As a result, she argued 
that it did not matter whether the parties ratified the CBA in July or in August because 
it was already effective retroactively to May. Thus, in her view WKH GLVSXWH ³DULVHV
XQGHU´WKH&%$Id. 
104.  Id. at 2862 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original). 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  See id. at 2864 (resting this conclusion on the narrow question that the Court 
felt was before it²whether Granite Rock should have augmented remedial avenues 
besides those already available).  
108.  Id. at 2863±64. 
109.  Id. at 2864.  
110.  See id. (characterizing an extension of Section 301(a) to tortious interference 
FODLPVDVDV³UHTXLU>LQJ@DKRVWRISROLF\FKRLFHV´  
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this statute would create policy concerns that could upset the balance struck 
between unions and employers under federal labor statutes.111 The Court 
preferred to retain Section 301(a)¶V FXUUHQW OLPLW RQ common law 
contractual remedies and rather than extend its reach to tort claims.112  
Justice Thomas concluded that even if Section 301(a) did authorize the 
federal courts to create a common law claim for tortious interference of 
contract, it would be premature for the Court to decide the issue because 
Granite Rock had not shown that other remedies were unavailable.113 For 
instance, Granite Rock failed to show that state claims were insufficient to 
provide a remedy.114 Granite Rock also failed to show that breach of 
contract or administrative claims, such as those falling under an alter-ego 
or agency theory, against the IBT would fail on remand.115  
%-XVWLFH6RWRPD\RU¶V9LHZ 
The Realpolitik of an Experienced Trial Court Judge 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred with the 
majority that Granite Rock could not bring a federal tort claim under 
Section 301(a), but disagreed that the formation dispute was one for the 
courts, and not for an arbitrator, to resolve.116 While the majority framed 
the formation issue as based on when, not whether, the CBA became 
binding,117 -XVWLFH6RWRPD\RUDUJXHGWKDWWKH³H[SUHVVUHWURDFWLYLW\´RIWKH
CBA neatly disposed of the formation dispute.118 ,Q -XVWLFH 6RWRPD\RU¶V
view, the CBA was retroactively effective at a date earlier than dates upon 
which both Granite Rock and Local 287 contended ratification occurred; 
                                                          
111.  See id. ³7KH EDODQFH IHGHUDO VWDWXWHV VWULNH EHWZHHQ HPSOR\HU DQd union 
relations in the collective-EDUJDLQLQJDUHQDLVFDUHIXOO\FDOLEUDWHG>@´LQWHUQDOFLWDWLRQV
omitted)). 
112.  See id. REVHUYLQJD³IUHH-ZKHHOLQJLQTXLU\´IRUDMXGLFLDOO\ FUDIWHG³GHVLUDEOH
UXOH´ZDV QHYHU LQWHQGHG E\ WKH &RXUW KDV LW KDV GHYHORSHG federal common law to 
effectuate Section 301(a)). 
113.  See id. DW³*UDQLWH5RFN¶VFDVHIRUDQHZIHGHUDOFRPPRQ-law cause of 
action is based on assumptions about the adequacy of the avenues of relief that are at 
OHDVWTXHVWLRQDEOH´ 
114.  Id. (espousing the other remedies still available to Granite Rock on remand and 
those that Granite Rock had already availed itself of). 
115.  Id. Justice Thomas noted that the agency or alter-ego claim against the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 8QLRQ PLJKW EH ³HDVLHU WR SURYH WKDQ XVXDO>@´ EHFDXVH WKH 1/5%¶V
GHFLVLRQ VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH ³,%7 DQG /RFDO >@ ZHUH DIILOLDWHG LQ  LQ D ZD\
UHOHYDQW WR *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V FODLPV´  Id. FLWLQJ ,QW¶O %KG 2I 7HDPVWHUV /RFDO 
(Granite Rock Co.) 347 N.L.R.B. 339, 340 n.6 (2006)). 
116.  See id. at 2866±67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(observing that there was no such dispute as to formation because both Granite Rock 
and Local 287 had expressly made the December CBA retroactive to May 1, 2004). 
117.  See id. at 2860 (majority opinion). 
118.  See id. at 2868 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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VKHZURWH WKDW³ZHFDQVFDUFHO\SUHWHQG WKDW WKHSDUWLHVKDYHD IRUPDWLRQ
GLVSXWH´119 Lastly, Justice 6RWRPD\RUGRZQSOD\HGWKHPDMRULW\¶Vargument 
that Local 287 had waived its ability to raise the express retroactivity in the 
'HFHPEHU &%$ DV DQ DIILUPDWLYH GHIHQVH WR WKH LVVXH RI WKH &%$¶V
formation date.120 :KLOHVKHQRWHGWKDWLWZDV³UHJUHWWDEOH´WKDW/RFDO
had not raised the issue in either the district court or the court of appeals, 
VKHIRXQGWKHDUJXPHQWZDV³RQH[the Court] FDQQRWLJQRUH´121   
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to settle the true scope of 
Section 301(a). Instead, the Court summarily pronounced any consideration 
of the possible toUW GLPHQVLRQ RI 6HFWLRQ D DV ³SUHPDWXUH´ -XVWLFH
7KRPDVZURWH ³>Z@H VHH QR UHDVRQ IRU D GLIIHUHQW UHVXOW KHUH EHFDXVH LW
would be premature to recognize the federal common law tort Granite Rock 
requests in this case even assuming that [Section] 301(a) authorizes us to 
GRVR´122 While this Delphic statement will not change how the majority of 
FLUFXLW FRXUWV DOUHDG\ YLHZ 6HFWLRQ D¶V VFRSH123 it will lend 
                                                          
119.  Id.  
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
122. Id. at 2864 (majority opinion). 
123.  See Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1174±75, 1175 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (referring 
to a string of opinions from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits that all refused to hold a federal tort claim as cognizable under 
Section 301(a)), DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶GLQSDUWVXEQRP*UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGof 
Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010). 
A decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Court in 1981, Wilkes-Barre 
Publishing Co., is the only decision holding that a tortious interference of contract 
claim may arise under Section 301(a). See Wilkes-%DUUH 3XEO¶J Co. v. Newspaper 
Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372, 380±82 (3d Cir. 1981). Wilkes-Barre 
3XEOLVKLQJ &RPSDQ\ ³:LONHV-%DUUH´ ILUVW EURXJKW VXLW LQ GLVWULFW FRXUW DOOHJLQJ LQ
relevant part, that the International Guild, the newspaper trade unions, the Wilkes-Barre 
Council of Newspaper Unions, and eight other individual defendants had tortiously 
induced a breach of a collective bargaining agreement under Section 301(a). Id. at 374. 
Wilkes-Barre alleged that, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, members 
of the Local Guild created a new publication called the &LWL]HQV¶9RLFH while on strike. 
Id. DW  $QG E\ HQFRXUDJLQJ XQLRQ PHPEHUV WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ WKH YHQWXUH ³WKH
unions and individuals involved in the &LWL]HQV¶9RLFH enterprise tortiously interfered 
ZLWKWKH>&%$@´ Id. at 376 (emphasis in original). While the district court dismissed 
the federal tort cause of action for failure to state a claim, the Third Circuit reversed, 
holding that a claim for tortious interference of contract was cognizable under Section 
301(a). Id. DW  7KH FRXUW KHOG 6HFWLRQ D ³reaches not only suits on labor 
FRQWUDFWV EXW VXLWV VHHNLQJ UHPHGLHV IRU YLRODWLRQ RI VXFK FRQWUDFWV´ Id. at 380. 
Furthermore, the court found its conclusion consisteQW ZLWK WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V
Section 301(a) jurisprudence. In his opinion, Judge Gibbons noted that Supreme Court 
SUHFHGHQWVXJJHVWHG6HFWLRQDVKRXOGEHUHDGEURDGO\DV³>D@OOVXLWVIRUYLRODWLRQ
of collective bargaining agreements are governed by feGHUDO ODZ>@´ Id. More telling, 
KRZHYHU ZDV WKH FRXUW¶V DGKHUHQFH WR SUHVHUYLQJ XQLIRUPLW\ ZLWKLQ WKH FROOHFWLYH
bargaining arena. The Wilkes-Barre court was less concerned with whether the remedy 
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uncertainty to the issue given Third Circuit precedent124 and the lack of 
Congressional action in clarifying the statute. 
The Court, in its attempt to preserve the careful calibration that ³IHGHUDO
statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collective-
EDUJDLQLQJDUHQD´125 may actually have unwittingly achieved the opposite 
effect. The CRXUW VKRXOG KDYH IROORZHG -XVWLFH 6RWRPD\RU¶V SUDJPDWLF
approach to the arbitrability issue, an approach that highlighted her 
adherence to the landmark principles of the Steelworkers Trilogy and one 
that more elegantly dealt with the dispute by finding it to be a classic 
H[DPSOHRID³FRQWURYHUV>\@WKDWODERUDUELWUDWRUVDUHFDOOHGXSRQWRUHVROYH
HYHU\GD\´126  
The consistent theme in Supreme Court precedent addressing Section 
301(a) is federal uniformity within the collective bargaining sphere. 
However convenient a ruling on this issue would have been, by failing to 
make a definitive decision about whether a federal tort claim is cognizable 
under Section 301(a), the Court strayed from its commitment to stability.   
The Ninth Circuit was also hesitant to recognize such a claim, choosing 
not to intrude into the legislative domain regarding the scope of Section 
301(a). That circuit maintained that it was not the duty of the courts, but of 
Congress to clarify Section D¶VWUXHUHDFK127 Nonetheless, there is no 
evidence that Congress intends to clarify the Act, especially given the 
litany of pressing domestic128 and international concerns.129 The Ninth 
&LUFXLW EHOLHYHG WKDW LW ZDV XOWLPDWHO\ &RQJUHVV¶ MRE WR FODULI\ Section 
D¶V VFRSHDQG WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW VHQt the issue back to the circuits 
                                                          
was labeled as one of contract or one of tort; rather, it IRXQG WKDW ³>D@ KROGLQJ WKDW
tortious interference with a collective bargaining agreement is not a matter governed by 
federal law would leave open the possibility of lack of uniformity in scope of 
obligation which the [Supreme] Court in Lucas Flour sought WRSUHYHQW´ Id. at 381. 
Lastly, the Third Circuit QRWHGWKDWWKHUHJXODWLRQRIWRUWLRXVLQWHUIHUHQFHFODLPV³GRHV
QRW LQYROYH DQ DUHD WUDGLWLRQDOO\ UHOHJDWHG WR WKH VWDWHV´ DV WKH HVVHQFHRI WKH FODLP
originates from federal common law governing labor agreements. Id.  
124.  See Wilkes-Barre, 647 F.2d at 381±82 (holding that a tortious interference of 
contract claim can arise under Section 301(a) of the LMRA).  
125.  Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2864. 
126.  Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
127.  $OWKRXJKLWJDYHRWKHUUHDVRQVWRGHQ\*UDQLWH5RFN¶VDUJXPHQWVWRILQGWKDWD
IHGHUDOWRUWFODLPFRXOGDULVHIURP6HFWLRQDWKH1LQWK&LUFXLWZURWHWKDW³>D@Q\
µgap¶ WKDWPLJKWH[LVWLQ&RQJUHVV¶VODERUODZGHVign is for Congress and not for us to 
ILOO´Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008), DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶GLQSDUWVXE
nom. *UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGRf Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010). 
128.  As of this writing, domestic concerns facing Congress include how to deal with 
a struggling economy, healthcare, and the aftermath of the biggest oil spill in United 
States history. 
129.  Although there are always pressing international concerns, Congress has had its 
hands full with how to deal with the war on terror. 
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unresolved.  
As 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the Steelworkers Trilogy,130 it 
VHHPV KDUGO\ FRLQFLGHQWDO WKDW -XVWLFH 6RWRPD\RU¶V GLVVHQW HFKRHV
principles similar to those set forth in 1960. Her language immediately 
brings to mind the principle of deference to arbitration. She invokes United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. early in her 
GLVVHQW WRVWDWH³>D@QRUGHU WRDUELWUDWH WKHSDUWLFXODUJULHYDQFHVKRXOGQRW
be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration 
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted 
GLVSXWH'RXEWV VKRXOG EH UHVROYHG LQ IDYRU RI FRYHUDJH´131 In addition, 
DQ\GLVFXVVLRQRIDQDUELWUDWLRQFODXVH¶VVFRSHVKHFRQWHQGHGPXVWKave a 
presumption in favor of arbitrability.132 
Following the Steelworkers Trilogy LQ  WKH MXGLFLDU\¶V SHUFHSWLRQ
of, and deference to, arbitration became dramatically positive.133 The 
principle of deference rang especially true with Justice Sotomayor. By 
finding that the ratification dispute arose under the arbitration clause of the 
CBA and deferring to the arbitrator, Justice Sotomayor sent a clear signal 
to the majority that the Court should reaffirm an expansive scope of arbitral 
authority, rather than pointlessly complicate an already convoluted subject 
area.  
In addition, by arguing that an arbitrator should resolve the questions 
surrounding the July strike because they are precisely the sort of questions 
that arbitrators are called upon to resolve every day, Justice Sotomayor 
echoed another principle set forth in the Trilogy: the emphasis of stability 
in the collective bargaining process over drafting perfection. In Warrior & 
Gulf -XVWLFH'RXJODVZURWH WKDW ³>D@PDMRU IDFWRU LQ DFKLHYLQJ LQGXVWULDO
peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the 
FROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQW´134 While Justice Douglas understood that 
a collective bargaining agreement could not hope to outline all disputes that 
may arise between parties, he aUJXHGWKDW³>D&%$@LVPRUHWKDQDFRQWUDFW
it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen 
                                                          
130.  See cases cited supra note 1. 
131.  Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2866 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582±83 (1960).  
132.  Id. 
133.  William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards²Thirty 
Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 464, 465±67 (1984) ³Steelworkers Trilogy established the proposition 
that substantial deference was to be given to arbitration awards²deference more 
considerable than that enjoyed by the Labor Board and by the trial courts 
WKHPVHOYHV´ 
134.  Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.  
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FDQQRWZKROO\DQWLFLSDWH´135 
Justice Sotomayor focused on the retroactive effect of the December 
CBA DQGDYRLGHGWKHPDMRULW\¶VZRUGSOD\RI when as opposed to whether 
formation occurred.136 She wrote that:  
When it comes to answering the arbitrability question, it is 
entirely irrelevant whether Local 287 ratified the CBA in August . 
RULQ-XO\,QHLWKHUFDVHWKHSDUWLHV¶GLVSXWH²which 
postdates May 1²FOHDUO\µDULV>HV@XQGHU¶WKH&%$which is all 
the arbitration provision requires to make a dispute referable to an 
arbitrator.137   
-XVWLFH 6RWRPD\RU¶V GLVVHQW LV ERWK HOHJDQW DQG HIILFLHQW 6KH ZRXOG
LPSRVH D ³VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG´ VROXWLRQ 6KH DYRLGV WKH PDMRULW\¶V VWUXJJOHV
ZLWK SDUVLQJ HDFK SDUW\¶V DUJXPHQWV RYHU ZKHQ FRQWUDFW IRUPDWLRQ
RFFXUUHG +RZHYHU KHU DUJXPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ /RFDO ¶V ZDLYHU RI WKH
retroactivity argument are somewhat porous, because such arguments may 
be deemeGZDLYHGSXUVXDQWWRWKH&RXUW¶V5XOHZKHQSDUWLHVGRQRW
raise them in a timely fashion.138 Despite this flaw, she recognized that 
adherence to some of the salient principles of the Trilogy carry greater 
weight in this case than blind commitment to procedure. 
In failing to rule definitively on the tort dimension, the Court not only 
lost an opportunity to clarify a circuit split, albeit a lopsided one, but also 
continued to muddy the water surrounding the precise scope of Section 
301(a). As a result, by WU\LQJWRSUHVHUYHWKH³EDODQFH>WKDW@IHGHUDOVWDWXWHV
strike between employer and union relations in the collective bargaining 
arena[,]´139 the Court, ironically, made this balance more difficult to 
maintain. 
The Steelworkers Trilogy provided the federal judiciary with principles 
that became the bedrock of labor arbitration jurisprudence. One of these 
principles is for courts to resolve any doubts as to whether an arbitration 
clause covers a particular dispute in favor of arbitrability.140 Another 
principle is for courts to recognize that drafters of collective bargaining 
agreements often cannot anticipate every situation that might lend itself to 
                                                          
135.  Id.  
136. See Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) RSLQLQJWKDWWKHGLVSXWHZDV³VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG´JLYHQWKH'HFHPEHU
&%$¶VUHWURDFWLYLW\ODQJXDJH 
137.  Id. (alteration in original). 
138.  Id. at 2868.  
139.  Id. at 2864. 
140.  See Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582±83 (providing that a matter should not be 
GHQLHG DUELWUDWLRQ ³XQOHVV LWPD\ EH VDLGZLWK SRVLWLYH DVVXUDQFH WKDW WKH DUELWUDWLRQ
FODXVHLVQRWVXVFHSWLEOHRIDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKDWFRYHUVWKHDVVHUWHGGLVSXWH´. 
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arbitration.141 There is an underlying theme in these principles: unions, 
employers, and the federal courts should all be participants in a culture that 
promotes arbitration of disputes. And as an ultimate goal, the principles 
promote federal uniformity and certainty within the collective bargaining 
sphere. 
The Supreme Court in Granite Rock strayed from its ultimate goal. 
7KRXJKWKH&RXUWFRQFHGHVERWKWKDW ,%7¶VDFWLRQV³VWULNHDW WKHKHDUWRI
the collective-bargaining process federal labor laws were designed to 
SURWHFW´142 and that Third Circuit precedent strays from the other courts in 
that it recognizes tortious interference for this type of conduct,143 the Court 
left the tortious interference question unanswered for the sake of judicial 
restraint. Because the Court found it premature to clarify a sixty-three year 
old law, fifty years after the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court has left the 
federal courts with uncertainty.  
At the same moment, the Court failed to recognize that CBAs are more 
than just contracts. CBAs are ³generalized code[s] to govern a myriad of 
cases which . . . draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.´144 Parties to a CBA 
thus do not merely contract between themselves; they agree to be 
participants in a system that promotes arbitration.  
Unlike the majority, Justice Sotomayor takes a more traditional 
approach. In her opinion, when both parties signed the CBA, which 
essentially predated the July strike, they both agreed to arbitrate any issues 
that might arise out of their agreement²no matter how convoluted the 
facts may be. In doing so, she retains the values that the Steelworkers 
Trilogy presents: that no draftsman could have anticipated this dispute and 
that any doubts to arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitrability. 
Because her opinion is a minority position, the core values of the 
Steelworkers Trilogy do not prevail, and judicial uncertainty remains.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Over the past twenty-three years, both the Ninth Circuit,145 explicitly, 
                                                          
141.  Cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 
³7KHGUDIWVPHQPD\QHYHUKDYHWKRXJKWRIZKDWVSHFLILFUHPHG\VKRXOGEH
DZDUGHGWRPHHWDSDUWLFXODUFRQWLQJHQF\´. 
142.  Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2865.  
143.  Cf. id. DW  ³7KH >1LQWK &LUFXLW@ MRLQHG YLUWXDOO\ DOO RWKHU &LUFXLWV LQ
KROGLQJWKDWLWZRXOGQRWUHFRJQL]HVXFKDFODLPXQGHU6HFWLRQD´ 
144.  Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578. 
145.  See Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that assertions 
by Granite Rock that the precedent from other circuit courts refusing to hold a federal 
common law of torts under Section 301(a) is distinguishable based on the close 
UHODWLRQVKLSRI/RFDODQG,%7LV³XQVXSSRUWHGE\SUHFHGHQW´DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶G
in part sub nom. *UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGRf Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).  
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and the Eleventh Circuit,146 impliedly, have fallen in line with the majority 
of their sister circuits and away from the sole contrary Third Circuit 
Wilkes-Barre Publishing decision. With the congruence of all of the other 
circuits denying tort claims in the Section 301(a) context, the Supreme 
&RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ QRW WR VHULRXVO\ FRQVLGHUZKHWKHU WR UHFRJQL]H D IHGHUDO
tort claim in the Section 301(a) context at this time was not unexpected. 
Such quick treatment is also puzzling, not because the Court declined to 
recognize an expansion of Section 301(a) but because it used such casual 
ODQJXDJH LQ GRLQJ VR $IWHU PDNLQJ UHIHUHQFHV WR WKH ³KRVW RI SROLF\
FKRLFHV´ WKDW FRXOG upset the balance Section 301(a) has maintained 
between unions and employers, the Court went no further²apparently 
ILQGLQJ WKDW WKHSDUWLHV¶EULHIVGLGDJRRGHQRXJK MRERIH[SODLQLQJ WKRVH
³LPSRUWDQW´ EDODQFH GLVUXSWHUV )XUWKHUPRUH WKH &RXUW XVHG WKH ZRrd 
³SUHPDWXUH´ WR ODEHO *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V UHTXHVW WR H[SDQG Section D¶V
scope. While the Court may have found it premature given the direction 
and general agreement among the circuits, concluding its discussion on the 
issue in this way left Section 301(a¶VVFRSHPRUHRSHQWKDQWKH&RXUWPD\
have wanted.   
This issue of whether a tortious interference of contract claim has a place 
in federal common law will continue to arise in collective bargaining 
disputes similar to the one that occurred between Granite Rock and IBT, as 
DSDUHQWXQLRQ¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQDGLVSXWH LQYROYLQJD ORFDOEUDQFK LVQRW
XQFRPPRQ 7KXV WKLV ZDV DQ LVVXH ULSH IRU WKH &RXUW¶V FODULILFDWLRQ
Nonetheless, an in depth discussion of whether a tortious interference of 
contract claim is cognizable under Section 301(a) will be reserved for 
another day.147 
                                                          
146.  Cf. Xaros v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 1987) 
KROGLQJ WKDW IRU SXUSRVHV RI 6HFWLRQ D ZKHUH WKH FDXVH RI DFWLRQ LV ³PHUHO\
UHODWHG´WRDFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQWWKDWFDXVHRIDFWLRQGRHVQRWDULVHXQGHU
the agreement for the purposes of a Section 301(a) action in federal court). 
147.  Similar to the paucity of courts favoring a federal tort claim, the number of 
articles in support of this expansion of Section 301(a) is also lacking. An extensive 
search on Lexis found one article proposing a tortious interference of contract claim to 
be cognizable under Section 301(a). One article appeared to support that claim given its 
WLWOHEXWDIWHUIXUWKHUUHYLHZLWRSSRVHGH[SDQGLQJ6HFWLRQDWR³SURYLGHDIHGHUDO
WRUW FODLP DJDLQVW LQWHUIHULQJ WKLUG SDUWLHV´ Cf. Elizabeth Z. Ysrael, Note, Federal 
Common Law of Labor Contracts:  Recognizing A Federal Claim of Tortious 
Interference, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1051±52 (1986) (arguing that the text and 
legislative history of Section 301(a) indicate that Congress only envisioned 
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements between the parties to the agreement, 
rather than the creation of rights against non-parties). 
